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Preface 
 
This thesis is written as a final project upon completing a Bachelor Degree in Mechanical Engineering 
with major in Process and Energy Technology at Stord/Haugesund University College. 
The report has a technical methodology on the issues regarding gas leaks. It will therefore be 
beneficial with a certain amount of technical understanding when reading. The approach towards 
gathering information has been to search for existing data, analyze previous reports on the matter 
and consult experienced people. With empirical data as the foundation I have discussed existing 
activities and proposed measures based on my own perception. 
When I first started with this thesis I had envisioned writing a more or less straightforward technical 
report. As I worked through material it dawned to me that the challenges with hydrocarbon gas leaks 
were quite broad and complex. It might be natural for a mechanical engineer student to take out 
some brilliant formulas to do calculations in the thesis work. I have learned that taking part of an 
industry as important as the natural gas industry requires a broader understanding of how things 
function. My thesis work has taken some unexpected turns along the way. I have enough unused 
notes to fill up an equally large report. Luckily this is information I am able to bring along as an 
engineer. 
During my work I have been privileged to speak with a lot of talented people who willingly shared 
their knowledge and experience, too many to mention by name. I would like to thank Willy Røed at 
Norwegian Oil and Gas for giving me advice along the way and encouraging me during my work. I am 
thankful for Gassco providing a good foundation for my research, especially my mentor Karsten 
Leland. Mr. Leland is a mechanical guru with an immense amount of experience in the field. Finally, I 
would like to thank my advisor at HSH, Sanjay Khattri for his understanding, encouragement and 
academic advice. 
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Summary 
Hydrocarbon gas leaks create potential dangerous situations with major accidents representing 
worst case scenarios. Smaller gas leaks are also unwanted as they represent risk of escalation and 
often lead to shut down or reduced production. Small gas leaks also represent in total a significant 
amount of gas which is detrimental to our atmosphere. Gassco supplies about 20 % of the natural gas 
consumed in Europe. Economic loss is a direct consequence initiated by shutdown or reduced 
production, as well as reliance regarding deliveries towards gas customers.  
The natural gas industry continuously invests considerable resources into prevention of gas leaks. 
Regarding the subject of hydrocarbon leaks, there exists an abundance of information, reports, 
procedures and suggestions. There is not always coherence between the available information so the 
essential for any operator in the industry is to select the relevant, and most important, information 
to ensure a safe operation.  
The discussion in this report has shown the complexity of hydrocarbon gas leaks. There are technical, 
human, and organizational factors contributing to the undesirable risk of gas leaks within the Gassco 
operatorship.  
Certain technical components more prone to leak are valves, flanges, gaskets, and heat exchangers. 
It is therefore important to ensure joint integrity on the facilitation and the execution level. 
Approximately 20 % of technical leak sources are due to technical degrading. Corrosion under 
insulation (CUI) has been introduced as an integrity challenge in this area. In order to improve 
integrity of process facilities it is necessary for Gassco to invest in measures to improve or reduce 
technical degrading, such as continuous programs for monitoring, inspection and maintenance. 
As the human factor is underlying cause of the majority of gas leaks the main focus area for Gassco is 
to get an overview of organizational factors creating risk. Within this area of concern there should be 
an increased investment in exchange of experience with more frequent workshops as a proposed 
measure. Reducing risk of possible misinterpretations of governing documents should also be 
assessed. 
Within gas detection there are some methods with distinct characteristics. Infrared technology 
enables visualization of fugitive emissions and continuous monitoring. The handheld gas camera FLIR 
GD320 is an efficient method of inspection. The stationary Gas Vision System appears to have 
potential to become an essential part of monitoring process facilities. 
Based on the discussion in this report it becomes natural to conclude that the most important safety 
barrier within the natural gas industry is the human factor. There has been an increased focus on the 
human factor in recent years with positive results of improvement. However, the industry aims at 
continuing the positive trend.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This thesis is based on a report prepared for Gassco during a summer internship in 2013. The 
research was made in the intent to get an overview of hydrocarbon gas leaks based on potential 
consequences ranging from major accidents to fugitive emissions. Barrier integrity and technical 
measures to reduce fugitive emissions according to governing documents were described. Certain 
methods of gas detection and measuring were mentioned roughly. As the report mainly described 
existing activities there seemed to be potential for a more thorough research in the field of 
hydrocarbon leaks. 
 
1.2 Description 
Hydrocarbon gas leaks create potential dangerous situations with major accidents representing 
worst case scenarios. Smaller gas leaks are also unwanted as they represent risk of escalation and 
often lead to shut down or reduced production. Small gas leaks also represent in total a significant 
amount of gas which is detrimental to our atmosphere. The natural gas industry continuously invests 
considerable resources into prevention of gas leaks. 
Gassco supplies about 20 % of the natural gas consumed in Europe. Economic loss is a direct 
consequence initiated by shutdown or reduced production, as well as reliance regarding deliveries 
towards gas customers. Most situations involving gas leaks or large emissions will be covered by 
local, national or even international media. Thus there will also be a reputational aspect associated 
with gas leaks regardless of the leakage rate and the extent of the situation. It will consequently be of 
Gassco’s interest to prevent such situations. 
Regarding the subject of hydrocarbon leaks, there exists an abundance of information, reports, 
procedures and suggestions. There is not always coherence between the available information so the 
essential for any operator in the industry is to select the relevant, and most important, information 
to ensure a safe operation.  
This thesis will discuss sources and conditions that might lead to hydrocarbon leaks. Previous 
incidents will be described with the intent to get an understanding of direct and underlying factors 
contributing to risk of gas leaks. Gas detection is foremost used for generating alarms to initiate 
safety measures. The report will also describe some gas detection methods which can function as 
possible proactive measures to prevent escalation of fugitive emissions. The final purpose will be to 
formulate a possible overall strategy for reducing risk of hydrocarbon gas leaks. 
 
1.3 Limitations 
This report focuses mainly on land-based activities such as processing plants and terminals. Thus 
there are some elements intentionally omitted that may seem natural to consider in connection with 
gas leaks. The purpose of this report is to describe the challenges Gassco as operator face in junction 
with gas leaks. To exemplify some areas of discussion, specific examples and cases have been used. 
Statoil is one of the Technical Service Providers (TSP) of Gassco operated facilities and performs 
measures to reduce gas leaks themselves. Some elements in the report are therefore generally 
described with examples from Statoil. 
 
The report covers hydrocarbons except in cases where other gases are specified. 
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1.4 Definitions 
LEL  Lower Explosive Limit: The lowest concentration of gas in the air required for the gas 
cloud to ignite. Concentrations of gas under LEL will not be able to ignite 
% LEL   Percentage of LEL: Expresses the degree of hazard - how near the gas present in the 
surrounding air is to the flammable region. 100 %LEL means the gas present has a 
gas/air ratio which can easily ignite in the presence of an ignition source.  
LELm  Denotes the gas concentration as %LEL multiplied with the length of the gas cloud. 
Does not describe how flammable the gas cloud is. 
Barrier  Technical, operational and/or organizational elements that individually or together 
shall prevent a concrete chain of events from occurring, or influence the events in an 
intended direction by limiting damages and/or losses 
Isolation Use of physical barrier to separate a plant and equipment from energy sources 
 
1.5 Abbreviations 
 
BAT  Best Available Technology 
BREF  BAT Reference Document 
EX  Explosion proof/category 
FLIR  Forward-Looking Infrared Radiometer  
GVS  Gas Vision System 
GWP  Global Warming Potential 
HC  Hydrocarbon   
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IR  Infrared 
NMVOC Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compounds 
NCS  Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NDT  Non-Destructive Testing 
NEA  Norwegian Environment Agency (Nor. Miljødirektoratet) 
OLF  Oljeindustriens landsforening 
POI  Points-Of-Interest 
PPM  Parts-Per-Million 
RNNP  Risikonivå i norsk petroleumssektor 
TEMA  Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association 
TSP  Technical Service Provider 
VOC  Volatile Organic Compounds 
  
4 
 
2. Necessity to Limit Gas Leaks 
Hydrocarbon gas leaks within the petroleum industry create potential dangerous situations. The 
possible outcomes may be major accidents or other situations that are unwanted, and many 
disasters have hit the gas industry over the last century. Furthermore, gas emissions to the 
atmosphere have been proven detrimental to the environment. Many companies also realize that 
loss of gas equals loss of money. This chapter will describe hydrocarbons and their properties as well 
as potential incidents with gas leaks.  
 
2.1 Hydrocarbons 
Hydrocarbons are organic compounds that only consist of hydrogen and carbon. The simplest group 
is the saturated hydrocarbons which have single bonds and are fully saturated with hydrogen. These 
are called alkanes. Unsaturated hydrocarbons have double or triple bonds and are called alkenes or 
alkynes. Cycloalkanes are constructed of one or more carbon rings. The aromatic hydrocarbons, also 
called arenes, have one or more aromatic rings. It is the saturated hydrocarbons that create the basis 
for petroleum products. Natural gas is a mixture of hydrocarbons but may contain traces of other 
gases such as nitrogen, carbon dioxide (CO2) and hydrogen sulfide (sulfur). Further references to 
natural gas will refer to saturated hydrocarbons as HC [1]. 
The main components of natural gas are [2]: 
 Methane 
 Ethane 
 Propane 
 Butane 
o Iso-butane 
o N-butane 
 Naphtha 
 Condensate 
 
The composition of the gas determines whether it is rich gas, dry gas or wet gas. Rich gas is raw gas 
consisting of methane, ethane, propane, butane, etc. Dry gas is natural gas with liquid hydrocarbons 
under normal pressure and temperature conditions, consisting essentially of methane and some 
ethane. Wet gas is natural gas with liquefied petroleum compounds, such as ethane, propane, 
butane and naphtha. It has high energy content and is often referred to as "bottled gas". Under 
atmospheric pressure the gas is partially liquid and must be transported by tankers. Natural gas is 
odorless and colorless, so sulfur compounds are added to provide a pungent smell [2]. 
 
2.1.1 Methane 
Methane is the smallest hydrocarbon and is mainly used as an energy source. Natural gas consists of 
between 75-95 % methane [2]. In combination with oxygen methane is explosive. All combustible 
gases have a specific flammable region in which the concentration is able to ignite. The region is 
bounded by the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and the Upper Explosive Limit (UEL).  
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Figure 1 - Flammability limits for methane1 
Concentrations of gas in air below LEL are too lean for combustion and concentrations above UEL are 
too rich to ignite. LEL and % LEL are therefore important terms when considering the flammability of 
gases. For methane the LEL is 5 % volumetric concentration of the gas in air and UEL is 15 %. If a “gas 
cloud” has a concentration of 5 % methane it has reached the flammable region and constitutes 100 
% LEL. Therefore, ignition sources must be avoided in areas where there might be presence of 
methane and oxygen.  
Below are listed some properties of methane. 
Table 1 - Properties of methane [3] 
Compound Methane 
Molecular formula CH4 
Content in natural gas 75-95 % 
Molar mass 16,04 g/mol 
Density (25°C, 1 atm) 0,656 kg/m3 
Melting point -182,5 °C 
Boiling point (1 atm) -161,49 °C 
Specific heat capacity 35,69 J/K*mol 
Higher heating value 55,5 MJ/kg 
Lower heating value 50,0 MJ/kg 
Lower explosion limit (LEL) 5 % 
Upper explosion limit (UEL) 15 % 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Shell presentation on “Gasslekkasje workshop - Bygnes 10.04.2014” 
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Carbon dioxide (CO2) has an atmospheric lifetime of several hundred years. For methane this 
atmospheric lifetime is around 12 years. However, it has become known in recent years that 
methane has a much higher heating value and therefore “collects” more solar heat in the 
atmosphere. It is multiple times more harmful than CO2, even in the long term of 500 years. In short 
term of 100 years it is estimated that methane is about 25 times more harmful than CO2. Thus 
methane is a greater contributor to global warming than previously assumed. From an environmental 
perspective it is therefore desirable to reduce methane emissions. Complete combustion of HC will 
produce a flue gas consisting of CO2 [4]. 
Global warming potential (GWP) is an index to compare the relative contributions from different 
gases to the greenhouse effect. CO2 is used as a reference point and therefore has a GWP value of 1 
[4]. 
Table 2 - Comparison of Global Warming Potential for carbon dioxide and methane [4] 
   
Global Warming Potential 
Compound   Lifetime (years) 20 years 100 years 500 years 
Carbondioxide CO2 50-200 1 1 1 
Methane CH4 12 72 25 7,6 
 
The GWP index is a tool used to calculate CO2-equivalent emission. One emission permit is calculated 
as one ton CO2. Consequently one ton of methane equals 25 permits [5]. 
 
2.1.2 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) 
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) are organic compounds with low boiling point which easily 
evaporates. The term covers solvents, gasoline and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, as well as the 
saturated hydrocarbon gases. VOC have negative health effects for humans and can damage 
vegetation. They can react with nitrogen oxides under the influence of sunlight to form ozone near 
the ground. Ozone is toxic to humans and can be harmful to animals, vegetation and materials [6].  
Since methane is the primary component of natural gas we often distinguish between methane and 
Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compounds (NMVOC). 
 
2.2 Political Aspects 
The Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA) regulates the emission permits in Norway on behalf of 
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme. The permit system is based on the Kyoto agreement 
of 1997. The emission permits include all the greenhouse gases and are expressed as CO2-
equivalents. One permit (quota) equals one ton of CO2. In accordance with the GWP index methane 
equals 25 CO2-equivalents and therefore one ton of methane is 25 emission permits [5]. 
The permits are assigned to companies which have emissions of greenhouse gases and companies 
can also buy additional permits [5]. Within the permits NEA demands that the companies perform 
certain activities regarding abatement of emissions as well as reporting of actual emissions. 
Companies are required to conduct regular measurements of emissions. In cases where actual 
emission is impossible to measure, an estimated amount is calculated on the basis of activity data. 
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Typical activity data estimation can be based on sampling and must be calculated after the following 
formulas [7, p. 5]: 
1. CO2-emission = Activity data* Emission Factor * Oxidation Factor 
(boilers, turbines, vents) 
2. CO2-emission = Activity data*Lower Heating Value*Emission Factor * Oxidation Factor 
(fugitive emissions, fire- pumps/training/generators) 
In order to comply with political regulations, Gassco has to ensure a proper reporting of emission 
data as well as documentation of measures to limit emissions. These abatement demands are in 
compliance with The European Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau’s Best Available 
Techniques reference document for refineries (BREF) [8]. The BREF emphasizes that the term Best 
Available Techniques (BAT) has to be applied in all areas where emissions and pollution can occur. 
 
2.3 Social Responsibility 
Gassco has developed a procedure regarding social responsibility called Management of Corporate 
Social Responsibility. Purpose of the document is to establish the importance of integrating social 
responsibility in Gassco’s governance processes. The procedure emphasizes the need to continuously 
prevent pollution, as well as emission of greenhouse gases, and other activities that may impact the 
environment. Within this action lies the need to identify sources of emissions and measurements. 
The document is based on international industry standards regarding social responsibility as well as 
internal governing documents. 
 
2.4 Potential Incidents 
Gas leaks regarding HC are normally associated with accidents or major accidents. Major accidents 
such as Piper Alpha in 1988, where 167 people died [9], and the Deepwater Horizon in 2010, in which 
11 died and 20 were injured [10], represent the potential extent of major gas leaks. Gas leaks can 
roughly be divided into major accidents, accidents (Nor. Nestenulykker) and fugitive emissions. 
The Major Accident Regulation (Nor. Storulykkeforskriften) defines a major accident as an event, 
such as a major spill, fire or explosion, as a result of an uncontrolled development that either 
immediately or later poses a serious risk to people, environment or material assets [11]. Accidents 
can be defined as gas leaks that are taken under control without major spills or ignition. These will 
also represent a degree of risk. A leakage rate under 0,1 kg/s is considered a fugitive or diffuse 
emission. This limit was originally recognized by The Petroleum Safety Authority because a rate of 
0.1 kg/s has sufficient energy to create potential for a major accident2. An overview of types of gas 
leaks are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 - Overview of types of gas leaks 
Type of event Gas leak Consequence 
Major accident Major leak Major spill, fire, explosion 
Accident Small or major leak Controlled: no major spill or ignition 
Fugitive emission Leakage rate <0,1 kg/s Large total emissions all sources 
 
                                                          
2
 E-mail from Willy Røed at Norwegian Oil and Gas (28.04.2014) 
8 
 
All HC leaks above 0.1 kg/s are registered and reported to authorities, as well as the total fugitive 
emissions. Gassco operated facilities register all unwanted events for internal review. In order to 
evaluate the extent of risk Gassco has developed a risk matrix which show relationship between 
probability of an incident occurring and potential consequences. The matrix is used to pre-evaluate 
new designs, evaluate existing designs and also to evaluate occurred events and the risk of 
escalation. In the case of an event the outcomes could have been different under changed 
circumstances. A small gas leak might have had potential to develop into a major accident under 
slight change of conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Gassco Risk Matrix: Graded green (acceptable risk), yellow (acceptable risk, 
but actions to minimize risk must be implemented) and red (high risk)3 
 
During the period 2008-2011 there were 56 registered HC leakages above 0.1 kg/s on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf [12]. In order to visualize the possible extent of HC leaks Norwegian Oil and Gas use 
the following example: 
Example [13, p. 23] 
Why has it been decided to concentrate on hydrocarbon leaks larger than 0.1 kg/s? Reasons include 
the fact that such leaks have the potential to cause a major accident if the hydrocarbons ignite. The 
higher the release rate, the more serious the consequences could be. Examples of what a 1 kg/s leak 
could cause include:  
                                                          
3
 Gassco document 
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 Unignited leak: release of toxic gas which fills most of an offshore module in seconds. Taking 
two-three breaths of this gas could cause loss of consciousness because of its narcotic effect.  
 Immediate ignition: a jet fire with flames up to 12-15 meters long. Possibilities of escalation 
if the flames reach other process equipment or structures without passive fire protection.  
 Delayed ignition: explosion with deadly overpressure in the whole module. High probability 
of a subsequent fire, and a possibility of escalation to other equipment/areas.  
 
This example demonstrates the potential consequences an HC gas leak can have with or without 
ignition.  
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3. Sources and Conditions Leading to Hydrocarbon Leaks 
In general, gas leaks are results of equipment that are not 100 % sealed and therefore enabling HC to 
be released to the environment. Gas leaks can lead to accidents or dangerous situations of varying 
degree. Fugitive emissions contribute to large total emissions. This chapter will look at gas leaks as a 
whole and discuss various sources and conditions.  
The Petroleum Safety Authority annually presents trend reports on risk level in the petroleum sector 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (RNNP4). A matrix with overview of initiating events from the 
phase 7 report has been used in order to label potential sources in the following subchapters. An 
initiating event is defined as a technical failure that might lead to a gas leak. The thorough analysis 
from the phase 7 report intends to supply information about the use of barriers to prevent actual 
leaks. It is a reasonable assumption that these characteristics are in compliance with international 
industry norms and therefore are representable for Gassco operated facilities. The types of initiating 
events are in RNNP categorized as follows [14, p. 70]: 
A. Technical degrading of the system 
B. Human intervention introduces hidden faults 
C. Human intervention causes immediate leakage 
D. Process disturbance 
E. Built design weakness 
F. External influences 
These initiating events are in correlation with a causal analysis performed by Norwegian Oil and Gas 
in the period 2008-2011 [12]. During this period there were 56 HC leaks on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf with a rate larger than 0,1 kg/s. The figure below displays the main causes of these 
56 HC leaks. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Overview of causes 56 hydrocarbon leaks 2008-2011: Yellow – External 
load; Red – Design errors; Green – Process disturbance; Purple – Human interference; 
Blue – Technical degrading [12] 
                                                          
4
 Nor. Risikonivå i norsk petroleumssektor (RNNP) 
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Based on this classification it is prominent that most sources can be traced back to the human factor:  
1. Direct influence from personnel causing leaks (B+C/Human interference, F/External load)  
2. Indirect influence concealed in design weakness; deviation between designed capacity and 
operating capacity (D/Process disturbance, E/Design errors) 
Considering this rough generalization it seems as if technical degrading and third party external 
influences (such as force majeure, accidents, etc.) are the only events that cannot be traced to the 
human factor “on-site”. External influence includes events caused by activities, such as lifting, that 
are not related to process operations. One can also argue whether technical degrading should be 
accounted for during the primary design process and in standard maintenance programs. However, 
there are certain technical areas that are particularly vulnerable to gas leaks. In the subsequent 
chapters sources and conditions are divided into process, technical and human factors. 
  
3.1 Process conditions 
Standard operating parameters, such as temperature, pressure and fluid velocity, are essential to 
account for when designing process equipment. Deviation between design and operating parameters 
can result in fatigue or rupture. Operational conditions should never exceed design limits more than 
allowed by the design standard. 
Cavitation is a phenomenon where the pressure sinks to below vapor pressure of the fluid and 
bubbles form in the gas. This boiling of the gas becomes problematic when the pressure rises again 
as the bubbles will implode. Implosion of the bubbles near metal surfaces might erode small parts of 
equipment. Below is an example of cavitation on the tubesheet in a heat exchanger. 
 
Figure 4 - Cavitation on tubes in a heat exchanger5 
Leakage in a process line will create change in fluid conditions as the fluid becomes more turbulent 
around this point. Depending on the size of the leak the change in turbulence gives off sound waves 
that might be detectable in the hearing range. The turbulence might contribute to a chain reaction of 
events leading to a larger leak or create other sources. It is therefore important to take indications of 
fugitive emission seriously. 
                                                          
5
 Statoil PowerPoint presentation, «Inspeksjonsfunn - Aldringsprosjektet» 
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In a process pipe with continuous flow there will be a balanced distribution of forces (see left side of 
Figure 5). If valves in connection with the pipe are operated quickly, there might occur pressure 
pulses due to change in acceleration of the fluid. This applies especially to valves with large 
differential pressure and in pipes with high fluid velocities. Pressure pulses create an imbalance in 
the distribution in forces if they reach bends or large expansion in cross sections and reflect back and 
forth (see right side of Figure 5).  
  
Figure 5 - Distribution of forces in a pipe: balanced forces (left) and unbalanced forces 
(right) [15] 
Pipe systems with expected pressure pulses are normally designed with reinforced support in 
vulnerable areas. Without supporting constructions pressure pulses can lead to rupture of the pipe. 
Some process operations can have higher fugitive emissions relative to high temperatures and 
pressures. The effect of this correlation is dependent on other parameters such as catalyst activities 
and availability of utilities. [8, p. 507] 
 
3.2 Technical conditions 
Typical sources for leaks are connections that are not welded and therefore constituting weakness in 
sealing ability. Flanged connections are used to enable pipe split for removal or blinding during 
maintenance or change of operational mode. To enable pipe split it is equally difficult to ensure a 
fully sealed area. This enables in particular fugitive emissions as well as the risk of escalation. Smaller 
scale pipes, called tubing, and the connecting fittings also constitute an important source of leaks. In 
addition to motion and vibrations technical degrading could lead to points that allow leaks. For 
emergency shutdown valves the risk is that they are normally stationary. After use they have a 
greater risk of leaking. Internal leakage, called internal passing, also represent a risk as the gas can be 
released to unexpected areas. 
Examples of possible sources of leaks are as follows: 
 Valves/Packing boxes 
 Emergency shutdown valves – ESDV (internal passing) 
 Blowdown valves (internal passing) 
 Flanges/Gaskets 
 Grease nipples 
 Couplings 
 Underneath insulation (Corrosion under insulation - CUI) 
 Tube connections 
 Compressor Seals 
 Flare 
 Heat exchangers 
 Tank floating roof seals 
 Ship loading 
 Others 
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These examples have in common that they are connections. In the following subsections the most 
typical technical sources of leaks will be described: valves, flanges, tubing and heat exchangers. 
Technical degrading will also be described. 
 
3.2.1 Valves 
Valves represent the majority of the total fugitive emissions with contribution of approximately 50-
60 % [8, p. 91]. According to perception in the industry about 60 % of these emissions are again 
result of the packing boxes. Valves that are operated frequently, such as control valves, can easily 
wear and further introduce a source of gas leak. Gate valves and globe valves have rising stems and 
can more often leak in comparison to quarter-turn type valves such as ball valves and plug valves [8, 
p. 91]. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Valves with rising stems: globe valve (left) and gate valve (right) [15] 
  
 
Figure 7 - Quarter-turn type valves: ball valve (left) and plug valve (right)  [15] 
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The possibility of leakage through valves is dependent on design, aging, maintenance, fluid 
properties, and especially sealing design. 
 
3.2.2 Flanges 
Flanges are connections designed to create flexibility in the process line. Equipment is connected to 
pipes with bolted flanges to enable maintenance or replacement. Example of a flange is shown 
below. 
 
Figure 8 - Example of a bolted flange [16] 
The bolts have to be mounted properly according to standards and specifications with sufficient 
torque and tension. Improper mounted flanges can easily become source of gas leaks. Depending on 
the design of the sealing system flanges can contribute to fugitive emissions as well as larger leaks. 
The possibility of leakage through flanges is also dependent on design, aging, maintenance, fluid 
properties, and sealing design. 
 
3.2.3 Small Bore Tubing 
Small bore tubing, often referred to as tubing, is defined as the discipline covering pipes with an 
outside diameter up to 2’’/50mm [17]. Below is an image describing the main terms regarding the 
tubing discipline. Compression fittings is the general term for all the connecting components.  
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Figure 9 - Main terms within the tubing discipline [17] 
There are several different brands supplying fittings. Combining components from different suppliers 
will not provide a fully sealed system and therefore introduce risk of leakage [17]. 
Tubing and fittings are managing the same fluids and fluid conditions as the larger pipes but quality 
control is normally less strict than for piping. Vibrations may be destructive for tubing, as well as for 
piping. Fatigue induced ruptures is an element important to consider when designing equipment and 
fluid parameters. 
 
3.2.4 Heat Exchangers 
Major factors that can cause leaks in heat exchangers are vibrations, fatigue and corrosion.  
Pitting corrosion differs from global corrosion as it occurs as pits and can develop holes through the 
material. It is difficult to observe the extent of the pitting corrosion in the tubes without use of non-
destructive-testing, such as Eddy Current or similar methods. Tubes with insufficient wall thickness 
are plugged. 
 
Figure 10 - Pitting corrosion6 
                                                          
6
 Statoil presentation at «Gasslekkasje workshop – Bygnes 10.04.2014» 
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Heat exchangers and their components have large fluctuations in temperature and pressure. 
Pressure cycles and especially temperature cycles are challenging for the flange connections. Rapid 
changes may lead to material fatigue. 
Types of flow induced vibrations for shell and tube heat exchangers include mechanical resonance 
and acoustic resonance in the tube bundle. The Tubular Exchanger Manufacturers Association 
(TEMA) has developed software to assess the possibility of vibration in relation to specific heat 
exchangers. Process parameters and heat exchanger parameters are plotted in the program which 
calculates possible occurrence of various types of flow induced vibrations. For tubular heat 
exchangers vibration can result in damage of surfaces, ruptures of the tubes or breach in the 
connection between the tubes and the tubesheet. 
 
Figure 11 - Examples of vibrational damage in heat exchangers7 
Normally in tubular exchangers, gas flows in the tubes and the heating/cooling medium flows on the 
shell side. The medium used can be water/steam or gas. Leakage in the tube bundle, so called 
internal passing, can lead to gas mixing with the shell side outflow. It is therefore crucial to have gas 
detectors close to the water outflow.  
In addition to fatigue and pitting leaks, heat exchangers have natural potential leak sources such as 
flanges. 
 
3.2.5 Technical Degrading 
Approximately 20 % of potential HC leak sources are due to technical degrading. Technical degrading 
includes the following [14, p. 70]: 
 Degrading of valve seats 
 Degrading of flange gaskets 
 Reduced tension in bolts 
 Fatigue 
 Internal corrosion 
 Exterior corrosion 
 Erosion 
 Other 
                                                          
7
 Statoil document, «Inspeksjonsfunn - Aldringsprosjektet» 
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Erosion is a process where small pieces of a metal surface are grinded down. This effect is reinforced 
when the fluid contains particles, such as sand, and also if cavitation occurs simultaneously. Over 
time there might develop visible damages impairing the pipe or equipment. 
 
Figure 12 - Damages due to cavitation and erosion8 
Corrosion under insulation (CUI) is a widespread problem in the industry representing perhaps the 
largest integrity challenge. Corrosion causes reduction in the wall thickness and can ultimately lead 
to holes or cracking of the pipe or equipment.  
 
3.3 Human Factors 
According to the HC project by Norwegian Oil and Gas 36 of the 56 HC leaks during the period 2008-
2011 were caused by human interference  [12]. The causal analysis shows that in some of the events 
more than one factor resulted in the leak. Table 4 displays the distribution of causes. 
Table 4 - Distribution of human related causes HC leaks 2008-2011 [12] 
Cause of HC leak Number 
Improperly executed isolation (blinding) 6 
Improperly executed flanges/bolts during maintenance 11 
Valves in wrong position after maintenance 8 
Wrong gaskets or improper mounting of gaskets 2 
Improper operation of valves 5 
Improper use of temporary process lines 2 
Removal of barriers during maintenance  5 
Work on equipment unknowing of still pressurized 2 
 
There exist procedures on planning, execution and completion of these operations which includes 
use of barriers and verification.  
 
                                                          
8
 Statoil document, «Inspeksjonsfunn - Aldringsprosjektet» 
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3.4 Examples of Previous Incidents 
The following chapter will briefly describe some incidents within Gassco operatorship involving HC 
leaks during the previous years in order to get an overview of trends of main causes. In all cases 
safety measures were taken and no major accidents occurred. These measures are excluded from 
this discussion. Economic losses directly caused by the incidents and indirectly due to reduction of 
production in other areas of operation have not been calculated. The first incident is not an actual 
accident but is used to describe necessary testing and technology qualification.  
  
3.4.1 Titanium Seal – Technology Qualification 
The report "Perspectives on Technological Change and Innovation in Norwegian Natural Gas 
Industry" [18] refers to testing of a flange gasket during the development of the natural gas industry 
in the late 1980s. The flange was new technology and the vendor had specified to use a standardized 
gasket of stainless steel. Under pressure tests with nitrogen the flange showed that the connection 
leaked. Several tests with attempts of innovation were executed but leakage was still the result. The 
final, successful conclusion was to produce a titanium seal with silver coating. The report emphasizes 
the importance of technology qualification, also considering sub-components such as gaskets. It is 
fundamental to have knowledge of this lesson where the main problem was the combination of 
familiar and new technology. With a gas industry that is constantly developing, it is important to have 
knowledge of materials to prevent gas leaks. Assumptions and empiricism is not necessarily good 
enough arguments to implement new technology into existing processing equipment. In such cases 
testing is required. 
 
3.4.2 Gas Leakage Butane Splitter at Kårstø (2007)9 
On the 22nd of March 2007, a leakage was registered in a flange between the cylinder head and the 
main section of the boiler 24-HA-405 during start-up of the Butane splitter 24-VE-403 at Kårstø. The 
investigation report pointed to several factors that resulted in a synergic effect leading to the 
leakage. Among the factors the following five were the main causes: 
 Wrong gasket type 
 Uneven surface 
 Insufficient roughness 
 Marginal torque 
 Span in flange connection 
The sealing ring used was of graphite laminated steel without serrations. This is considered less 
robust than the specified cam profile sealing ring. The surface of the flange should preferably be 
more serrated to increase the forces applied to each contact point. The uneven surface was 
measured to approximately 1.5 mm. During assembly the supplier’s recommendation on tightening 
torque had been applied. The report refers to a general consensus that the torque value 
recommendation was too low for the circumstances of the respective flange. The span in the flange 
connections may have contributed to less tolerance for other weaknesses. The report states that 
there is no direct cause for criticism, but points to several negative elements and weaknesses. The 
situation was handled in a good way avoiding injury and property damage. Operating loss was 
calculated to 156 MSm³ rich gas during the four days production was shut down.  
  
                                                          
9
 Statoil document, «Gransking av Gasslekkasje, NG – Kårstø» 
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3.4.3 Condensate Leakage at Kollsnes (2009) 
During normal operation on 19th of May 2009 there was a condensate leak at Kollsnes as result of a 
gasket blown out of a flange. The incident could have had serious consequences, but the material 
damages were limited and there were no injuries. Kollsnes process plant was shut down for 2.5 days 
so the economic consequence was corresponding to the down time. The investigation report 
concluded that the precipitating cause of the incident was use of far too low tension on the bolts on 
the flange. Correct tension should be 300Nm with hydraulic tensioning tool while surveys showed 
that actual tension was between 80-100Nm. The bolts were only manually tightened and the bolt 
tensioning tag had not been removed giving misleading information. The report stated that the event 
was caused by lack of tension on the flange bolts, lack of verification between delivery from supplier 
to Statoil Hydro Operations and lack of compliance with the supervisory duty. There are procedures 
covering these operations but they were not complied with [19]. 
 
3.4.4 Gas Leak Butane Splitter T300 at Kårstø (2010)10 
The Sleipner Condensate processing facility at Kårstø started up in 1993. A new butane column was 
installed in connection with the Kårstø Expansion Project in 2005 (KEP2005) introducing changes in 
the feed stream conditions. Previously the column was designed for a two-phase feed while the new 
changes were one-phase feed. No further modifications were performed. Some operating periods 
have had low inlet fluid velocities as well as low inlet temperatures. This led to quenching and 
collapse of gas. Since the expansion in 2005 there have been reports of vibration giving off sound in 
the feeding pipes in the butane splitter.  
On the 17th of March 2010 a leak in the inlet flange of the butane splitter column was detected. The 
leakage rate was approximately 0.025 kg/s. Main factors causing the leak were the changes in 
feeding conditions with no further modifications of the column and operating periods with low 
feeding rate. 
The internal investigation concluded that there had been no breach of governing documents but 
there were some barriers that were broken. 
 
3.4.5 Hydrocarbon Leakage at Mongstad (2010) 
During startup of the reactor R-5006 at Mongstad on the 12th of September 2010, HC odor was 
registered by an operator. The operator applied gas tests at the reactor several times. When he 
finally found a leakage in the stuffing box on a thermowell he tried to pull the nut attached to this. 
The entire thermowell blew out with 23 bar back pressure upon which the operator got hurt in the 
hand. According to the contingency plan, the reactor was shut down, isolated and depressurized to 
flare. During the shutdown there was another prolonged butane leak on the heat exchanger of 
approximately 2.5 hours. [20] 
Direct causes of leakage in the reactor were as follows [20]: 
1. Installed thermowell was designed for lower pressure 
2. Mechanical connection between flange and thermowell instead of welded  
3. Pipe fitting was mounted with pressure tool as it was perceived that it was a standard bolt 
Direct causes of leakage in the heat exchanger were as follows [20]: 
                                                          
10
 Statoil document, «Dybdestudie – Gasslekkasje T300 butansplitter 02.08.2010» 
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1. The differential pressure in the heat exchanger increased by shutdown of the reactor 
2. Wrong gasket type: ran out of specified package (double jacket), too long delivery - ordered 
another gasket (massive steel gasket) 
3. Too low torque (600Nm instead of 800Nm) 
4. Leak test had been performed with too low pressure 
 
3.4.6 Hydrocarbon Fire Next to Butane Boiler in T200 Kårstø (2013)11 
On the night of February 9th 2013 a fire occurred by the butane boiler in T200 at Kårstø. HSE-work 
had already been implemented in conjunction with a registered fugitive HC leakage and it was this 
leakage that ignited. The fire was put out and personal injuries were avoided. Two days before the 
incident there was registered leakage of steam, tripping of the cooling compressor, increased 
temperature in the steam system and blocked steam valves.  
 
The risk evaluation showed that the possible severity of both personal injury and property damage 
could increase under slightly different circumstances. The subsequent report concluded with two 
broken barriers: current specifications for isolating flanges were not followed and there was 
inadequate risk assessment for HSE in conjunction with the fugitive leak. 
 
3.4.7 Hydrocarbon Leak in T410 Expander Building Kårstø (2013)12 
On 23rd of May 2013 a gas leakage occurred on the oil expander on the train T410 at Kårstø through 
one of the sight flow indicators. The rubber seal on the sight glass had slipped out and ruptured. This 
was the third incident of the same character since 2007. The internal investigation team identified 
weaknesses in the design of the sight glass and routines regarding them. The manufacturer of the 
glasses had specified a torque of 79-84Nm. According to the specifications the bolts should be 
tightened daily after assembly until no further change in torque. Measured torque after the incident 
showed that the values for both glasses were far below specification.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
11
 Statoil document, «Brann rundt butankoker i T200, Presentasjon av dybdestudie, 09.02.13» 
12
 Statoil document, «Dybdestudierapport - Gasslekkasje fra seglass oljesystem T410, 20.06.13» 
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3.4.8 Summary of Incidents 
Below is a summary of the incidents and causes. 
Table 5 - Summary of previous incidents 
Incident Consequence Cause 
Titanium seal - technology 
qualification • Leak in pressure vessel • Lack of TQ (wrong seal) 
Gas leakage butane splitter 
Kårstø (2007) 
• Leak in heat exchanger 
girth flange 
• Wrong gasket according to 
specification 
    • Uneven surface 
    • Insufficient roughness 
    • Marginal torque 
    • Span in flanged connection 
Condensate leakage Kollsnes 
(2009) • Gasket blew out • Low torque 
    • Lack of verification 
    • Lack of supervisory duty 
Gas leak butane splitter T300 
Kårstø • Fugitive leak • Change in feeding conditions 
    • Low cycle operating periods 
Hydrocarbon leakage Mongstad 
(2010) • Thermowell blew out • Design for lower pressure 
  • LPG leak reactor • Improper mounted flange 
    • Improper mounted fitting 
  
• Butane leakage in heat 
exchanger • Increased differential pressure 
    • Wrong gasket 
    • Low torque 
    • Wrong leak test 
HC fire next to butane boiler 
Kårstø (2013) • Pipe flange leakage • Breach of specification 
    • Inadequate risk assessment 
HC leak in expander building 
Kårstø (2013) • Gasket slipped out • Low torque 
    • Weakness design 
    • Inadequate routines 
 
Based upon this overview of occurred events it seems natural to make two conclusions: 
1. Causes are directly linked to the human factor in such a way that human interference 
introduces hidden faults. For example will lack of torque on bolts not be visible at first but 
constitute a weakness until an event occurs. 
2. There is a synergic effect between several factors leading to a gas leak, implying the 
importance of barriers. 
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4 Preventive Measures to Reduce Risk of Gas Leaks 
In order to reduce risk of gas leaks it is necessary to have proactive measures to prevent gas leaks 
from occurring as well as reactive actions to limit the consequences. This chapter will mainly focus on 
the proactive aspect. Based on the discussion in chapter 3 it emerged that the human factor 
represent higher risk of gas leaks than technical conditions. Thus will some conditions from the 
technical subchapter be accounted for under the following subchapter regarding human factors. 
 
4.1 Reducing Process Related Leak Factors 
Since the main process related leak factors can be linked to deviation between design and operating 
parameters, it is essential to account for potential changes in operation during the design phase. Use 
of the TEMA software described in chapter 3.1.4 is one activity that enables increase of capacity in 
heat exchangers.  
Sounds due to cavitation and vibration are events that indicate critical process factors. Reports of 
such must be reported to competent personnel for inspection and monitoring. 
The level of fugitive emissions can be influenced by process design conditions such as temperature, 
pressure and vapor pressure. Fugitive emissions are relatively lower in some operations with lower 
operating temperatures and pressures, where the vapor pressures are lower. In operations with high 
fugitive emissions there should be assessment whether lowering of operating conditions might be 
beneficial [8, p. 507]. 
 
4.2 Reducing Technical Leak Sources 
As discussed in chapter 3.1 there are certain technical components more prone to leak. To discuss 
reduction of technical leak sources the following actions are considered: 
 Reduce number of potential leak sources 
 Ensuring joint integrity 
 Precautions of technical degrading 
 Monitoring, inspection and maintenance 
 
4.2.1 Reduce Number of Potential Leak Sources 
When designing new process lines it is possible to reduce the actual number of sources. During the 
pre-assessment phase the number and types of flanges and valves should be assessed towards risk of 
leaks. Valves and flanges are natural sources of fugitive emissions and also constitute potential for 
larger leaks.  
 
4.2.2 Ensuring Joint Integrity 
Bolted flanges are joints with potential to leak and it is therefore essential to mount the bolts with 
proper tension and torque. These values are specified by the suppliers of the flanges according to 
certain conditions, which might be insufficient for the intended use. TSP’s also have specifications 
including different, or even stricter, methods and values for mounting. Flanges have to be marked 
with tags with information about all performed operations: values, when it was performed and by 
whom. Norwegian Oil and Gas (Nor: Norsk olje og gass)13 has developed detailed manuals14 covering 
                                                          
13
 Previously OLF (Oljeindustriens landsforening) 1989-2012 
23 
 
execution of work on flanges, valves and tubing. Training courses are offered by certified providers in 
accordance with the manual on flange work. These training courses are mandatory for mechanics 
working on HC-bearing equipment within Gassco operated facilities. 
The joints must be equipped with proper sealing systems for non-standard joints. Technology 
qualification is an important factor as different materials have different sealing qualities. 
Implementation of a seal in a flange or a valve must be assured according to Gassco governing 
document on Technology Qualification. Empirical data and assumptions are not sufficient. 
The UK company Hydratight has developed a service called Joint Integrity Assurance (JIA). The 
principle behind JIA is to assure all phases of work on bolted flanges. According to Hydratight their 
philosophy is based on the ASME stated principle that all bolted joints should be treated like it were 
welds15.A weld has to be thoroughly documented on material choice, competence of the welder, 
NDT verification, hydrostatic testing, etc. Implementing this strict philosophy onto flange work will 
raise the integrity of the joints. Hydratight has also developed an identification system giving the 
specific joint a unique number which is configured in software to give an overview of the project. 
Every joint is attached a 4-part weatherproof tag to visualize the status of the specific joint. The four 
parts are “Joint to be broken”, “Joint to be assembled”, “Joint to be tightened” and “Joint tightened”. 
Every part has an electronic identification code (barcode) on the back and has to be signed 
continuously during the project. Joint activity history can be linked to the ISO drawing, enabling each 
joint to be identified on the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID). This form of standardization 
and monitoring enables a more detailed overview of joints and their integrity. Previous history has 
shown that routines regarding flange work and especially tagging has introduced weakness 
concerning joint integrity.  
 
4.2.3 Precautions of Technical Degrading 
Technical degrading of pipelines and equipment is inevitable. Assuring good integrity is essential to 
reduce the risk of leaks. As previously discussed, corrosion under insulation (CUI) constitute a major 
integrity issue. Locating damaged areas prior to actual leaks is a key factor. Non Destructive Testing 
(NDT) is continuously applied to give overview of wall thickness. Pipes and equipment with large 
reductions will be replaced. Statoil at Kårstø process plant has since 2003 applied a new approach to 
the facility’s oldest part with distance insulation16. The method uses a perforated spacer between 
pipe and insulation enabling natural ventilation and cooling with air and also draining water particles. 
Historical inspection data have shown no severe cases of CUI in areas with use of distance insulation. 
Beerenberg is an innovative company within the CUI field. The company’s research and development 
(R&D) department is currently working on three technologies in their CUI project17. As these 
technologies are patent pending and under R&D they will only be described in brief: 
1. Drain plug with indicator (patent pending – ready for production): intended to detect, collect 
and visualize water 
2. Hygroscopic cable (patent pending – under testing): intended to detect moisture through a 
Time-Domain Reflectometer with possibility to detect and position several spots  
3. Advanced fiber technology (patent pending – R&D phase): gives possibility for real time 
monitoring of changes in corrosion or pipe wall thickness, and detecting moisture 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14
 Previously OLF Guidelines 118, 119, 120 
15
 Hydratight presentation by Paul Holland on «Gasslekkasje Workshop - Bygnes 10.04.2014» 
16
 Statoil presentation by Svein Lohne on «Gasslekkasje Workshop - Bygnes 10.04.2014» 
17
 Beerenberg presentation by Geir Harris on «Gasslekkasje Workshop - Bygnes 10.04.2014» 
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Testing of the hygroscopic cable has shown that the technology represent advantages such as easy 
and flexible installation, detection with great accuracy without need for dismantling existing 
insulation, and easy collection of data. The collected data has to be analyzed by specialist. These 
three technologies are preventive measures to reduce the risk of corrosion based leaks and it will 
therefore be of Gassco’s interest to follow up on further development. 
 
4.2.4 Monitoring, Inspection and Maintenance 
Ensuring necessary integrity of process facilities requires good routines for monitoring, inspection 
and maintenance.  
Monitoring routines supplies overview of the overall integrity. All operations on pipes and equipment 
have to be documented with necessary data and verification. Any observations of non-conformities 
have to be registered for further inspection. Daily visual inspections enable for example detection of 
small emissions and other indications prior to actual incidents. Gas detectors have a set point of 20 % 
LEL which is higher than fugitive emissions.  
Based on registrations of non-conformities inspections can be conducted with necessary equipment. 
Regular inspection on areas of concern provides information for assessment whether further 
maintenance or repair should be initiated. 
All process facilities have routinely maintenance programs according to standards and specifications 
on all pipes and equipment. These maintenance programs are regardless of non-conformities and are 
essential to ensure high integrity. 
Programs with regular monitoring, inspection and maintenance are crucial for reducing risk of gas 
leaks. 
 
4.3 Reducing Human Related Leak Sources 
In order to reduce human related leaks it is utmost important to understand the complexity of the 
actual causes. To simplify further discussion human factors have been divided into three levels: 
1. Technician level: This level represents the “work force” executing work on hydrocarbon 
bearing equipment 
2. Supervisory level: This level represents the responsible unit that receives work orders, plan 
projects, organize technicians and verify upon completion 
3. Management level: This level represent the entire management system that are responsible 
for safe operation; Gassco as operator is included in this category 
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4.3.1 Reducing Risk on Technician Level 
Below is a visualization of the risk factors associated with Technician Level. 
 
 
Figure 13 - Factors associated with Technician Level 
Technicians’ physiological factors, such as health issues, may affect the quality of the work 
performed. Measures to reduce errors based on physiological factors are beyond the scope of this 
report. 
Competence is a concept influenced by skills and experience. Initial skills are achieved by education 
and training, and maintained by further training. Experience is also achieved through training as one 
will establish a certain routine and understanding of operations. Certification ensures sufficient level 
of competence. Statoil has developed a verification program at the Kollsnes process plant where 
technicians are tested in flange work at an on-site test facility [21]. Use of separate training facilities 
to regularly test workers is a good measure to maintain these certified skills. 
A technician’s psychological ability to perceive situations and assess possible outcomes is part of the 
cognitive aspect. Competence and cognitive factors combined is perhaps the most important part of 
a well-functioning process facility, as well as the area with most potential for errors. It is essential 
that personnel working with different operations regarding HC bearing equipment have sufficient 
competence and risk assessment to handle any situation, that being standard operation or unwanted 
events. Coursing of personnel according to the Norwegian Oil and Gas manual on flange work is an 
effective measure in this field. Verification courses or test rigs in relation to tubing should also be 
implemented. 
Standardization of certain areas of operation will contribute to reduced risk of skill-based errors. 
Technicians alternating between projects must be able to recognize the correct components and 
procedures. For an example can color coding on components lead to incorrect choice if suppliers 
apply different colored tags. 
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Attitude towards HSE rules and instructions on a technician level is an area receiving limited 
attention. This aspect is brought up in this report to introduce discussion around the topic for future 
research. Some issues to consider evaluating the HSE culture on the technician level are as follows: 
 Do technicians respect HSE regulations? 
 Do technicians follow HSE regulations? 
 Are procedures violated with intent? 
 Does experience lead to more “shortcuts”? 
If technicians perceive the organization as hierarchical there might develop a certain disrespect of 
governing documents which can spread to the overall HSE culture. A healthy HSE culture is important 
to ensure safe operations. 
 
4.3.2 Reducing Risk on Supervisor Level 
Below is a visualization of the risk factors associated with Supervisor Level. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Factors associated with Supervisor Level 
The Supervisor unit receives governing documents such as work orders with detailed description of 
projects. In compliance with current procedures specific work operations must be organized. To 
reduce possibility of errors within these project stages it is essential that the documentation received 
is clear without room for misinterpretation: what are the criteria for the operation, what procedures 
apply for the specific operation, which barrier (isolation) system is to be used, which components and 
materials are to be used, and so forth.  
Table 4 shows distribution of direct causes of previous HC leaks. However, all the mentioned 
operations require verification which indicates that this is an area of concern. Verification is intended 
to function as a safety barrier, where performed work is verified by another process operator. 
Human error in execution of operations on HC bearing equipment must be eliminated during the 
verification process. Possible measures to strengthen this barrier are workshops with focus on risk 
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assessment, ensuring governing documents are clear and training of relevant personnel. Norwegian 
Oil and Gas has made a short film to illustrate the importance of verification [22]. 
In order to maintain a correct overview of process facilities it requires reliable documentation and 
tagging. It is important that registered data is accurate. Although it is within Technician Level’s 
instruction to fill out documentation it is initially the Supervisor Level’s responsibility to ensure this is 
achieved. 
After gas leaks investigations are conducted to identify causes. These incident reports mainly focus 
on direct causes, often technical factors, and underlying causes such as lack of verification. However, 
it might be of interest for Gassco and the relevant TSP to conduct more thorough qualitative 
investigations. Workshops including technical specialists, HSE representatives and people related to 
the incident can contribute to a broader, qualitative causal analysis.  
It is within the Supervisor Level’s responsibility to register all non-conformities and observations. In 
order to follow up on these findings it is important that the quality of the data and the general 
routines are appropriate.  
 
4.3.3 Reducing Risk on Management Level 
Below is a visualization of factors the Management Level must comply with. 
 
Figure 15 - Factors the Management Level must comply with 
International and national legislations set guidelines for company operations. It is within the 
Management Level’s responsibility to implement applicable legislations into governing documents 
and ensure that the entire organization complies. In relation to risk factors discussed under 
Supervisor Level it is important that governing documents leave no room for misinterpretation.  
In addition to legislations there will naturally be a certain amount of empirical data to consider. This 
data can be internally registered based on unwanted events or retrieved from other participants in 
the industry. Workshops involving several different representatives build a solid foundation for 
exchanging experience. Representatives from TSP’s, industry organizations, suppliers, and others are 
able to contribute with a substantial amount of experience. Stimulating to a flow of empirical 
knowledge across the industry will improve the Management Level of operation. Gassco as operator 
Level 3    
Management 
Political 
legislations 
Developing 
governing 
documents 
HSE culture 
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has the executive responsibility and is included in this Management level. It will therefore be within 
Gassco’s responsibility to facilitate workshops of this kind on a regular basis.  
Gassco has yearly arranged gas leak workshops since 2011 with the intent to18:  
 Increase knowledge and understanding of the risk linked to HC leaks 
 Share experiences, positive and negative 
 Openly discuss areas of improvement and “best practices” 
 Present and discuss new technology 
 Identify possible measures and actions 
Workshops of this kind involve participants with different backgrounds and with unique competence. 
The informal framework contributes to a strengthening of the Management Level’s ability to reduce 
risk of gas leaks. The general recommendation to improve organizational factors to reduce risk is 
increased focus on workshop in terms of frequency, length and participants. It might be of relevance 
to include representatives from the Supervisor Level or even Technician Level. Involving Technician 
Level representatives in workshops might also have a positive effect if the organization is perceived 
as hierarchical.  
As discussed in chapter 4.5.1 HSE culture is the foundation of safe operations. A healthy culture is 
established by the Management Level. This aspect is also beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
  
                                                          
18
 Introduction by Alvin Hansen at «Gasslekkasje workshop Bygnes 10.04.14» 
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5 Secondary Measures to Reduce Gas Leaks 
This chapter will consider secondary measures to reduce gas leaks. The preventive measures in 
chapter 4 are intended to either avoid gas leaks or reduce fugitive emissions. Experience confirms 
that fugitive emissions are inevitable, but it will be of Gassco’s interest to limit these to a minimum. 
Gas detection is often categorized based on toxic or combustible gases. HC gases are combustible 
thus gas detection in this chapter will focus on this category. In any case involving gas leaks it is 
utmost important that this is detected and that the surroundings are aware of its presence. Primary 
gas detection will generate alarm when sensing a given amount of gas in order to notify that the area 
might be explosive. However, most fugitive emissions will not achieve a leakage rate that 
immediately will trigger gas detectors. It is therefore necessary with gas detection that can locate 
sources of small leaks as well. 
 
5.1 Biological Methods 
Biological methods of gas detection include the use of humans or animals. Trained personnel can 
inspect parts of a plant using vision, sense of smell or hearing. Gas leaks can emit distinctive noises or 
vibrations which can be observed by humans. Specially trained dogs can also be used for detecting 
gas leaks. Using dogs for gas detection will be difficult on Gassco’s process facilities due to limited 
access. However, dogs can be used to detect corrosion. 
5.1.1 Use of Dogs to Detect Corrosion 
Fjellanger Detection and Training Academy (FDTA) is in the final process of developing an efficient 
method of CUI detection by using dogs. The project is funded by Gassco and supported by Statoil. Air 
samples are taken at the process plant in specially designed capsules and transported to FDTA for 
analysis by special trained dogs. During the two years project period the method has shown reliable 
detection of corrosion. Implementing this method in maintenance programs enables early detection 
of CUI and actions can be taken to prevent gas leaks. [23] 
 
5.2 Visual Methods 
Visual methods are based on the use of visual signs of gas leaks.  
5.2.1 Visual Inspection 
Visual inspection by operators on process facilities are conducted on a regular basis. Any 
observations which can indicate possible gas leaks are reported and further inspected with use of 
additional equipment. Visual inspection will also reveal other integrity issues. 
5.2.2 Soap Test 
The soap test is an easy and well-used method to locate small leak sources and detect fugitive 
emissions of the scale grams per hour. Soap, or a soap mixture, is applied to an area and a leak will 
be visible as small bubbles on the surface. This is a simple method that is easily applied: training is 
not required, there is no need for comprehensive preparations and it will instantly detect the 
presence of a leak. It is mostly used on an already assumed leak source, or to examine a newly 
installed flange or valve. Covering a large area will be time consuming. In such a way the method can 
be categorized as a simple but limited method of leak detection. 
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5.3 Vacuum Method 
This method uses a portable vacuum system with an extended probe which is carried over a 
supposed leak to detect small leakages. The devices are often referred to as “sniffers” and are widely 
used on Gassco facilities. Sniffers provide results of the calibrated gas, for example methane, in 
parts-per-million (ppm), volume percentage (vol %) or in correlation with LEL (%LEL). Below is an 
example of a vacuum device. 
 
Figure 16 - E-instruments Gas Sniffer Model 7899 [24] 
The method can be used to verify that a newly installed component is mounted correctly. Sniffers are 
easy to use without comprehensive training or preparation. However, it is time consuming to screen 
a large area.  
 
5.4 Infrared Methods 
Infrared (IR) radiation is electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths in the range of 700nm - 1mm 
which is longer than visible light. Gas detection technologies using IR radiation is based on energy 
difference between a medium and the environment. Gases absorb a certain amount of energy 
depending on the molecular composition. HC gases absorb radiation with wavelengths around 3.3 
micrometer19 [25].  
IR gas detectors emit radiation and the receiver can detect presence of gas in the form of reduced 
received signals. This technology is used in point- and line detectors to generate alarms in the 
concentration range 0-100 % LEL. These detectors are calibrated for the gas most likely to be present.  
IR technology is also used to visualize gas leaks by using thermographic cameras. 
 
5.4.1 Infrared Point Detectors 
IR point detectors consist of a transmitter and an optical receiver that is calibrated to detect gas in an 
area between them. The point detector constitutes a single unit so it must be in direct contact with 
the gas, and thus detecting the concentration in the surrounding air. In presence of gas, some of the 
energy from the emitted IR beams is absorbed by the molecules in the gas. The received signal will 
                                                          
19
 3.3 micrometer = 3300 nm 
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have a reduction of intensity which is proportional to the concentration of gas. The detectors are 
connected to an electronic computer system. A reduction in the received signal relative to a given 
percentage of LEL will generate a gas alarm. [26] 
 
 
Figure 17 – Simrad GD10 Infrared Point Detector [26] 
 
 
Figure 18 – Block diagram of Simrad GD10 Infrared Gas Detector [26] 
  
The gas alarm set point for methane is usually 20 % LEL (See Figure 1) indicating low alarm and 30 % 
LEL for high alarm [27].  
If only one detector generates alarm it is classified as “Single gas”20. Actions within this alarm are 
automatic disconnections of ignition sources, such as temporary equipment and non-EX equipment, 
                                                          
20
 Norske Shell presentation on «Gasslekkasje Workshop - Bygnes 10.04.2014» 
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until the situation is under control. “Confirmed gas” is when two detectors in the same area generate 
alarms. Responsive action to this will be the same as for “single gas” but shutdown procedures will 
also be initiated. 
 
5.4.2 Infrared Open Path Detectors 
IR open path detectors work according to the same principle as point detectors with IR signals from 
the transmitter and an optical receiver. The difference is that open path detectors consist of two 
units placed in a distance from each other. Transmitter and receiver can be placed in the same device 
with a reflective unit placed at a distance to reflect the IR beams back into the sensor. This is referred 
to as a short range detector. An open path detector can also consist of two separate units for the 
transmitter and the receiver. The principle is shown in Figure 19 using Searchline Excel Open Path IR 
Detector [27]. 
 
 
Figure 19 - Principle Searchline Excel Open Path IR Detector [27] 
The range of an open path detector can be up to 200 m. A long range enables detection of small gas 
clouds with concentrations below 20 % LEL. Open path detectors measure gas concentrations as LEL-
meter (LELm) which is the percentage of LEL multiplied by the range. Alarm set point for these 
detectors is from 1 LELm, dependent on the area classification [27]. 
According to the supplier of Searchline Excel the frequency used is so intense that it rejects other 
light sources such as interference from sunlight, lightning, flare and welding. Nor shall it be affected 
by water vapor, fog or inert environments [28]. 
Because of the long distance between transmitter and receiver, there is a possibility that workers 
unintentionally disrupt the beam and consequently generate a false gas alarm.  
For best utilization a combination of point detectors and open path detectors should be mounted in 
a matrix system to cover a broad area, both vertically and horizontally. As a general rule open path 
detectors can be used to frame in areas and critical equipment while point detectors monitor a site. 
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5.4.3 Handheld Infrared Camera 
An IR camera is in short terms heat sensitive photography. The images visualize a color spectrum that 
looks like a cloud in the area photographed. From the visualization trained persons can interpret 
various information about the leak such as which gas is leaking, approximate size and source. 
Advantages of these cameras are that examination can be done from a safe distance and can cover 
large areas where a potential leak source is not specified. [29] 
 
Figure 20 - Examples of infrared gas images [30] 
FLIR21 Systems Inc. is a commercial international company providing thermographic cameras. The 
handheld camera FLIR GF320 is specially designed to detect methane and other VOC. The camera 
weighs 2.4 kg and can easily be transported around for inspection. This enables detection of gas leaks 
without shutting down parts of the plant. The inspection is visualized in real time as a video or 
images which can be stored on a standard computer with the appropriate software. FLIR camera can 
detect both major leaks and fugitive emissions. Analysis of the images must be performed by 
competent personnel to separate gas from any possible interference. GF320 is not EX-proof so 
specified work permit is required when using this in a process plant [29]. 
 
Figure 21 - FLIR GF320 Infrared Camera [29] 
FLIR GD320 is implemented into the regular inspection program by Shell at Nyhamna with good 
results22. 
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 FLIR: Forward Looking Infrared Radiometer 
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 Shell presentation at «Gasslekkasje workshop - Bygnes 10.04.2014» 
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5.4.4 Gas Vision System23 
The Gas Vision System (GVS) uses a technique called gas correlation imaging to continuously monitor 
a given area. Two IR camera sensors, one of which contains an optical cell with methane, take two 
simultaneous images. The methane gas cell is intended to filter out the effects of a methane leak. 
Together they create a differential signal which provides a superimposed visual image of a gas leak. 
The spectroscopy technology will color any methane in the combined image presenting a realistic 
visualization with a colored leak cloud. 
 
Figure 22 - Block diagram of the Gas Vision System14 
The GVS is a stationary camera which is set according to Points-Of-Interest (POIs). The sensors can 
aim at several POIs and rotate automatically between them. It is possible to override the predefined 
monitoring points and control the device manually. Video signals are continuously sent to the control 
room for interpretation. 
 
A pilot project on Kalstø Landfall Valve Station at Karmøy has confirmed that GVS provides a reliable 
automatic detection of methane emissions within specified criteria (greater than 0.2 LELm 
concentrations). The project has shown improvements towards the conventional manual detection 
of fugitive emissions. Compared to point and open path detectors GVS represent a significant 
improvement in gas detection (see Figure 23 and Figure 24). This is due to large area coverage and 
combination of real-time visualization and automatic gas alarm based on IR visualization. Point 
detectors are only able to monitor the surrounding air which results in a large number of units. Open 
path detectors only monitor a given “line”. 
                                                          
23 Statoil document, ‘Technology First Use Report – Gas Vision System’, (May 2013) 
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Figure 23 - Comparison point gas detector (left) and GVS (right)14 
 
 
 
Figure 24 - Comparison open path detector (left) and GVS (right)14 
 
The weakness of GVS is that the system is sensitive to fog and heavy rain. As the technology is based 
on temperature difference between methane and the environment, there will also be challenges 
associated with snowfall and extreme cold. This is a challenge with all IR based technology so the 
general recommendation is to use a combination of technologies. Rotation between multiple POIs 
results in several minutes between scans of one specific point.  
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5.5 Catalytic Gas Detection 
Catalytic sensors are based on the principle that combustible gases oxidize on the surface of a 
catalyst leading to increase in temperature. Catalytic gas detectors consist of an active element 
functioning as a catalyst and a coated inactive element serving as a temperature compensator. The 
two elements are connected through a Wheatstone Bridge circuit. In the presence of combustible 
gases the surface of the active element will oxidize and lead to increase in temperature in the circuit 
and further initiate an increase in resistance. Although considered robust, catalytic detectors have 
the risk of contamination due to exposure of certain gases, such as lead, sulfur and silicone. The 
detection range is also limited as high concentrations of combustible gases might lead the sensor to 
display incorrect values [31].  
Statoil has reported that catalytic point detectors have underestimated concentrations of process 
gases containing more than one compound [27]. 
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6 Conclusion 
The discussion in this report has shown the complexity of hydrocarbon gas leaks. There are technical, 
human, and organizational factors contributing to the undesirable risk of gas leaks within the Gassco 
operatorship.  
Certain technical components more prone to leak are valves, flanges, and heat exchangers. It is 
therefore important to ensure joint integrity on the facilitation and the execution level. 
Approximately 20 % of potential leak sources are due to technical degrading. Corrosion under 
insulation (CUI) has been introduced as an integrity challenge in this area. There are technologies 
under development to prevent CUI. In order to maintain a sufficient integrity of process facilities it is 
necessary for Gassco to invest in measures to improve or reduce technical degrading. 
As the human factor is underlying cause of the majority of gas leaks the main focus area for Gassco is 
to get an overview of organizational factors creating risk. Within this area of concern there should be 
an increased investment in exchange of experience with more frequent workshops as a proposed 
measure. Possible measures to reduce risk of misinterpretations of governing documents should also 
be assessed. 
Within gas detection there are some methods with distinct characteristics. Infrared technology 
enables visualization of fugitive emissions and continuous monitoring. The handheld gas camera FLIR 
GD320 is an efficient method of inspection. The stationary Gas Vision System appears to have 
potential to become an essential part of monitoring process facilities. 
Based on the discussion in this report it becomes natural to conclude that the most important safety 
barrier within the natural gas industry is the human factor. There has been an increased focus on the 
human factor in recent years with positive results of improvement. However, the industry aims at 
continuing the positive trend.  
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